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J.: Libel--Libel Per Se--Fair Comment--Attributing Anton-Semitism to
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
pretation by the bituminous coal operators and their employees,
with the recognition of this agreement by the wage and hour division in its administrative policy, it seems safe to assume that
there is no controversy today on this point in West Virginia.
Whether the point will have to be litigated in the future would
seem to depend on future changes in existing employer-employee
relations in the coal industry.
E. I. E.

LinEs-

Lmmr Per Se -

FAiR COIIMENT -

AT rBTJTrnG ANTI-

P was a representative in Congress
and D printed in a newspaper words in the nature of an editorial
to the effect that Father C was waging a fight to prevent the appointment of a Jewish judge and that the appointment was violently opposed by P, who was, according to the article, "known as
the chief congressional spokesman of Father C." D furthermore
said that the basis of the opposition of P to the appointment was
that the proposed appointee was a Jew, and one not born in the
United States. The article also stated that P had called a caucus
of Ohio representatives to protest against the appointment. An
order granting D's motion to dismiss the declaration for libel in the
absence of an allegation of special damages was reversed. Herd,
that the statements are libelous per se and therefore no allegation
of special damages is necessary. Sweeney v. Schenectady Union
Publisking Co.'
SEMrITSI! TO CONGRESSMAN. -

Unless spoken words fall into one of these categories they are
not actionable without proof of special damages: (1) words
charging certain crimes, (2) words accusing one of having certain
communicable diseases, or (3) words tending to harm a person in
his trade, business, profession or offfce.' Any libel is actionable
are supported by a long history of bona fide collective bargaining agreements.
In view of the circumstances described by the industry in submitting its inquiry, Colonel Fleming announced that practice of computing time on a "face
to face" basis in the bituminous coal mining industry would not be unreasonable. Colonel Fleming explained the term "face to face" to mean the productive work performed after the miner arrives at his usual working place.
excluding the time spent in traveling from the portal or entrance of the mine
to the place of work and the time spent in returning from the working place
to the portal in the evening ... " UNiTm STATEs DEP'T OF LABOR, WAGE A-D
Hour DIVSION, Release R-928 (July 27, 1940).
1122 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), rehearing denied, Aug. 15, 1941.
2HARPEB, TORTs (1933) § 238.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1942

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [1942], Art. 17
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
without proof of special damages.3 However, libel is divided into
libel per se, that is, words libelous upon their face, and words which
require one to show extrinsic circumstances rendering the words
sued upon libelous. 4 ' This showing is the common law innuendo
but is certainly nothing akin to the requirement of a showing of
special damages found in the law of slander. Therefore, it appears
that this court, like those of Tennessee,' Ohio,6 and Idaho,' to whom
the same facts were presented, confused the requirement of a showing of special damages with the question whether the statements
were libelous pee se.,
Nevertheless, the instant case did present the question whether
the alleged words of the article were libelous p.er se under a proper
application of the term. In the other jurisdictions mentioned, the
courts found the statements were not libelous per se, but in all three
the same confusion as to the use of the term "libel per se" appears.8 In a fourth ease on the same facts, but involving more extended pleadings, the court held that the statements were not
libelous per se, apparently applying the term "libel per se" correctly.9 It must be remembered, however, that the instant case
was decided under New York law and that the requirements as
to what constitutes libel per se vary from one jurisdiction to another. 10 The decision that the statements here were libelous per so
was partly based on the prevailing social attitude against antiSemitic intolerance developed by Nazi-Fascist persecutions."
It is universally recognized that a right of fair comment or
privileged criticism"s does exist. However, the better opinion is
that the commentator must confine himself to accurate statements
of fact; but if he states the facts correctly, he may freely express
his conclusions and opinions based on those facts within reasonable
3 Hughes v. Samuels, 179 Iowa 1077, 159 N. W. 589 (1916); Hodges v.
Cunninghmn, 160 Miss. 576, 135 So. 215 (1931); Comment (1927) 40 HARV. L.
REv. 323; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 569(C); HArPER, TORTS § 243.
4Lemmer v. The Tribune, 50 Mont. 559, 148 Pac. 338 (1915); Owens v.
Clark, 154 Okla. 108, 6 P. (2d) 755 (1931).
'Sweeney v. Newspaper Printing Corp., 147 S. W. (2d) 406 (Tenn. 1941).
6 Sweeney v. Beacon Journal Pub. Co., 35 N. E. (2d) 471 (Ohio, 1941).
T Sweeney v. Capital News Pub. Co., 37 P. Supp. 355 (D. C. Idaho 1941).
s Supra notes, 5, 6 and 7.
9 Sweeney v. Caller-Times Pub. Co., 41 P. Supp. 163 (D. C. Tex. 1941).
10 Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, 262 N. Y. 99, 186 N. E. 217
(1933); Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Pub. Corp., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N.
E. 209, 44 A. L. R. 1419 (1926); Bennet v. Commercial Advertiser Ass'n, 230
N. Y. 125, 129 N. E. 343 (1920).
1"Comment (1941) 55 HARV. L. REv. 298; 33 Am. JuR. § 58. The opinion
in the instant case specifically stated that these matters were to be considered
in determining what constituted libel per se.
12 RESTATMIENT, TonTs § 606.
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limits."3 The difficulty in applying this rule arises from the obvious
problem of determining what statements are statements of fact and
what are statements of opinion. The dissenting opinion in the instant case seems to have overlooked this distinction and based its
remarks upon the broad social policy of free criticism of public officials. The practical test, developed by the courts to determine
whether a statement is one of fact, is whether a reasonable man
would justifiably have believed upon reading the statement that it
was a fact or merely an opinion based upon stated facts. 14 It appears under this test that the statements in question, or at least
some of them, were statements of fact, allegedly false, and therefore, there would be no reasonable room for a defense on the ground
that the statements made were within the realm of fair comment.!
I. D. J., JR.
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AG-NT. - The employment by defendant, a nonresident corporation, of a Georgia citizen for sales work in Georgia contemplated
the use of such resident's duly licensed and registered automobile
in the conduct of the nonresident's business. For injuries incurred
in an accident resulting from the agent's negligent operation of his
automobile in the course of his employment, plaintiff instituted this
action against the employer by service on the Secretary of State.
Held, that the employment was not a statutory appointment of the
Secretary of State as defendant's agent to receive service of process.
Wood v. Win. B. Reilly & Co., Inc.'
The court points out that the vehicle was being operated on
local highways not by virtue of privileges bestowed on the nonresident by the statute,' but under the rights of an owner of a duly
13 Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158, 191 (1878) ; Alderson v. Kahle, 73 W.
Va. 690, 80 S. E. 1109 (1914); Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass.
238, 28 N. E. 1, 13 L. R. A. 97: (1891).
',Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353, 83 N. W. 110, 51 L. R. A. 451 (1900);
HARP'E,

ToRTs § 251.

15 Supra n. 9, wherein the court held the statements were not libelous per
so and added, by way of obiter dicta, that anyway they were privileged. Privilege is a distinct doctrine from fair comment.
140 F. Supp. 507 (N. D. Ga. 1941).
2 GA. CODE AN-N. § 68-801 (in substance providing that acceptance by any
nonresident, including corporations, of the privilege of operating a motor
vehicle in Georgia shall be deemed equivalent to appointment of the Secretary
of State as attorney to receive service of process in any action or proceeding).
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